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Abstract 
 
In this master thesis we examine the asymmetric volatility in stock market returns, 
i.e. why the stock market is more volatile in down turns than in up turns. By 
examining the Norwegian stock market, we find no support for the feedback 
hypothesis and conclude that the leverage effect at best is a weak explanation for 
the asymmetric volatility. We suggest that combining the traditional rational 
explanations with a behavioral approach will give a better understanding of the 
asymmetric volatility. Our data analysis supports prospect theory as a reasonable 
explanation for the asymmetric volatility in the market. Further, we find support 
for a heuristic explanation based on affect, representativeness and extrapolation 
bias. We also find a one day disposition effect, supporting a behavioral approach. 
 
 
 
We want to thank our supervisor Kjell Jørgensen for his support and comments, 
and Oslo Børs for providing us with data. 
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1. Introduction 
Asymmetric volatility refers to the phenomenon that stock price volatility tends to 
have a negative correlation with stock return (Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet 
2008). When stock prices falls (rises), volatility tends to increase (decrease). The 
mainstream finance approach has developed two rational explanations for this 
phenomenon. The leverage hypothesis states that negative returns increase the 
leverage of the stock, and with more leverage, i.e. more risk, the stock gets more 
volatile (Black 1976). Low (2004) examines the leverage hypothesis and 
concludes that the leverage explanation for the asymmetric volatility is at best a 
weak one, and suggests a behavioral explanation. The other mainstream 
explanation for the asymmetric volatility is the volatility feedback hypothesis. 
Expected return rises when volatility rises, hence the stock price must fall 
assuming constant dividend (Brooks 2008). Campbell and Hentschel (1992) 
conclude that the volatility feedback normally has little effect on returns. Hibbert, 
Daigler and Dupoyet (2008) reject that the leverage hypothesis and the volatility 
feedback hypothesis could explain the asymmetric volatility adequately, and 
propose a behavioral explanation based on representativeness, affect and 
extrapolation.  
 
Mainstream finance is based on assumptions of rational agents (Stracca 2004).  
While expected utility theory is based on how people should take decisions, 
Kahneman and Tversky have studied how people actually make decisions 
(Kahneman 2011). There seems to be a clear discrepancy between the underlying 
assumptions in the mainstream finance theory and how people really behave. 
Thaler (2000) predicts that Homo Economicus, the normative rational human 
model, will evolve into Homo Sapiens. It seems clear that people do not act 
according to the rational agent model, but can behavioral finance explain 
aggregated market behavior? According to prospect theory losses hurts twice as 
much as gains psychologically (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In this paper we 
will examine whether this or potentially other behavioral explanations could 
explain the asymmetric volatility. 
 
What effect that is the main determinant of the asymmetric volatility in stock 
markets still remains an open question. In this paper we expand on the existing 
literature by examining how the non-behavioral theories fit the Norwegian stock 
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market and by focusing on the behavioral approaches that might explain the 
asymmetric volatility phenomenon. 
 
Earlier studies propose different behavioral explanations of asymmetric volatility, 
such as the disposition effect (Boujelbene 2011), representativeness, affect, 
extrapolation bias (Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet 2008) and loss aversion (Low 
2004). The different studies propose a behavioral explanation in the absence of a 
satisfying non-behavioral explanation. However, it seems like they do not 
compare the different potential behavioral explanations, and that the behavioral 
explanations are selected more or less coincidentally. We will in this thesis first 
examine the leverage hypothesis and the feedback hypothesis. If we could reject 
that the non-behavioral explanations fully could explain the asymmetric volatility, 
this would potentially support the behavioral explanations. Subsequently, we will 
do an analysis of the different behavioral theories and find the most plausible 
behavioral explanation.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature by including all the most known potential 
explanations for the asymmetric volatility in one paper. This holistic approach 
makes it possible to compare the different theories, both rational and behavioral.   
We also analyze more detailed the relationship between prospect theory and 
aggregated market data than earlier studies. 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In section two we review the 
background and existing literature regarding the asymmetric volatility, the 
rationality discussion and the behavioral concepts. Section three and four 
describes methodology and data. Empirical results are presented in section five. 
The discussion and conclusion is presented in section six and seven, respectively.  
 
2. Background and literature 
 
 2.1 – Volatility, the leverage hypothesis and the feedback hypothesis 
Within the field of finance, the most studied relationship is the one between risk 
and return. Firms and individuals constantly try to maximize the value of their 
investment by gaining the largest amount of return for the least amount of risk. 
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Consequently, forecasting risk is important for asset allocation, risk management, 
and for taking bets on future volatility. In mainstream finance the variance or the 
standard deviation is used as the metric for risk, and hence the previous variance 
(volatility) is what is modeled in order to forecast risk. This can be done in 
numerous ways, whereby the simplest one is to use historical standard deviation.  
 
To deal with “the implausible assumption of a constant one-period forecast 
variance”, Engle (1982) introduced the Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model, which recognizes that the volatility in stock 
markets is time varying. Since the introduction of the ARCH model, several 
hundred research papers applying this methodology to financial time series data 
have already appeared (Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner 1992). Several extensions to 
the model have also been introduced. Among the extensions, the perhaps best 
known, is the General ARCH, called the GARCH model. It was introduced by 
Bollerslev in 1986 and models the conditional variance as a weighted function 
dependent upon the long-term average volatility, the most recent innovation to 
volatility and the fitted variance from the model during the previous period.   
 
Later, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) developed the GARCH model 
further, to involve an additional term that allowed for different impacts on the 
conditional volatility, depending upon if the return innovation was positive or 
negative. With this model it is possible to formally measure whether or not the 
volatility is symmetrical, and the impact on the conditional volatility.  
 
Today, there exist numerous financial articles and empirical evidence suggesting 
that stock return volatility is negatively correlated with stock returns, with a 
greater asymmetric effect with negative return (Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet 
2008). Black (1976) was among the first to criticize the use of constant volatility 
in financial models. He believed that stock returns were related to changes in 
volatility. In his research he found that as stock prices went down volatility went 
up (and vice versa), and he was the first one to introduce this as a leverage effect. 
The reasoning behind this argument relates to the fact that a decrease in the value 
of a leveraged firm generally causes a rise in the firm’s debt to equity ratio, which 
again causes the risk of the firm, or the volatility of the equity to rise. Later, 
Christie (1982) also found support for the negative relation between volatility of 
Master Thesis – GRA 19003   September 2nd, 2013 
Page 4 
the rate of return on equity and the value of equity, and he claimed that “it is in 
substantial part attributable to financial leverage”. However, Black (1976) and 
Christie (1982) as well as Schwert (1989) show that the financial and operating 
leverage cannot fully account for the predictive asymmetry of future volatility 
(Braun, Nelson and Sunier 1995).  
 
An alternative explanation for the asymmetric volatility in stock returns is the 
volatility feedback hypothesis (time-varying risk premium theory). This theory 
states that if expected returns increases when stock price volatility increases, a rise 
in volatility should lead to a fall in stock prices. In other words, this theory 
suggests a reversed causality compared to the leverage effect; here the return 
shocks are caused by the change in the conditional volatility. French, Schwert and 
Stambaugh (1987) regress stock returns on unexpected changes in volatility and 
find a negative coefficient, which they attribute to volatility feedback. Campbell 
and Hentschell (1992) demonstrate the feedback hypothesis theoretically, showing 
that an increase in volatility causes negative returns. Their empirical findings 
suggest that volatility feedback is important in times of high volatility. However, 
they find that normally the volatility feedback effect has little effect on returns. 
 
Numerous authors have further researched the asymmetric pattern in the stock 
market. Schwert’s (1989) findings suggest that there is an asymmetry in the 
volatility-return relation, meaning that negative returns correspond to a larger 
increase in volatility than do positive returns. Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
(1993), uses their modified GARCH-type model to take this relationship into 
account. Their main result shows that a negative innovation to returns should lead 
to an increased conditional volatility, compared to a positive innovation of the 
same magnitude. Braun, Nelson and Sunier (1995) also test the asymmetric 
pattern with a modified GARCH model. They find that at the market level, 
volatility tends to rise strongly in response to bad news and fall in response to 
good news.  
 
Further investigation on the topic highlights the opposite theories and how the 
empirical results differ from study to study. Figlewski and Wang (2000) study the 
leverage effect and in short they find that the leverage effect is really only a 
“down market effect” that may have little direct connection to firm leverage. 
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Bekaert and Wu (2000), on the other hand, find asymmetry in the Japanese stock 
market and relate it to the volatility feedback hypothesis. They also test and reject 
the pure leverage model of Christie (1982).  
 
Since their introductions, the leverage effect and the volatility feedback 
hypothesis have been heavily researched. Usually, only one of the theories is 
tested, and so far, the empirical results have been mixed, weak or inconclusive. 
The lack of conclusive evidence over the past has motivated us to research this 
field further, with focus on behavioral explanations.  
 
Low (2004) studies the relation between option traders’ risk perception and 
contemporaneous market conditions. He found that financial leverage (but not 
operating leverage) is a plausible explanation for the general negative risk-return 
relation, but that it is at best a weak explanation. He also suggests that a 
behavioral explanation, based on Kahnemans’s “loss aversion” concept, could in 
fact be a more appropriate explanation. Further, Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet 
(2008) test both of the non-behavioral approaches. They find that neither the 
leverage hypothesis nor the volatility feedback hypothesis can adequately explain 
the asymmetric volatility. They propose a behavioral explanation, which involves 
representativeness, affect, and extrapolation bias. Another author, Boujelbene 
(2011), examines asymmetric volatility before and during the subprime crises and 
concludes that the disposition effect could explain the asymmetry. 
 
What effect that is the main determinant of the asymmetric volatility in stock 
markets still remains an open question. In this paper we expand on the existing 
literature by examining how the non-behavioral theories fit the Norwegian stock 
market and by focusing on the behavioral approaches that may explain the 
asymmetric volatility phenomenon.  
 
2.2 – Rationality and irrationality 
The Homo Economicus model states that the market participants are rational 
unemotional agents (Thaler 2000). People in the real world are clearly not like 
this. However, applying the Homo Economicus assumption is not necessarily 
wrong if the markets are well described and predicted based on this assumption 
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(Stracca 2004). Active portfolio strategies do not outperform passive strategies, at 
least when transaction costs are taken into account (Malkiel 1995). This could be 
viewed as an indicator that markets are rational and efficiently priced. However, 
market rationality in the beat-the-market sense does not necessarily mean that 
behavioral anomalies could not disturb rational asset pricing (Stracca 2004). In 
other words, the absence of arbitrage opportunities does not necessarily imply that 
the assets are rationally priced.  
 
Black Monday, October 19th 1987, the New York Stock Exchange dropped with 
over 20% in the absence of any relevant news. Bubbles like this may indicate 
behavioral anomalies and irrational markets (Stracca 2004).  According to Taleb 
(2007) “Black Swan events” are events that have a low degree of predictability 
and make a large impact. The dot-com bubble and the September 11th terrorist 
attack are other examples of Black Swan events. Most risk measures exclude the 
possibility of Black Swans. Before the stock market drop of over 20% in 1987, the 
standard deviation of S&P 500 was about 1%. Given a normal distribution, the 
1987 crash would only happen one time every 4.5 billion years (Reider 2009). 
Risk measures of variance take into account the normal variation, but outliers and 
fat tails makes inference based on normal distributions false. Models excluding 
Black Swans give a false belief that we could measure uncertainty. Since Black 
Swans are not expected to happen we have no defense against it, as was shown by 
the subprime mortgage crises in 2008. What you don’t know and don’t expect is 
more relevant for the risk than what you do know.  
 
Most market participants view loss as the true financial risk (Low 2004). In 
mainstream finance risk is measured by the variance. Higher variance includes 
both higher up and downturns. In reality investors are more concerned about the 
downside, and “upside volatility” is good. High volatility related to negative 
return, i.e. asymmetric volatility, might illustrate the discrepancy between the 
classical risk measure and how investors actually perceive risk.  
 
Another explanation of asymmetric volatility could be that it simply reflects the 
reality of news. If negative news appears in clusters, volatility might be high when 
stock markets fall. The turmoil after the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 may be 
an example of falling markets with a lot of uncertainty and news with extreme 
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impacts. In such times, asymmetric volatility may be a rational reflection of 
reality.  
 
Mainstream economic theory assumes all participants are rational, but in reality 
they are not. A stock trading above its fundamental value may be rational to buy if 
you believe it would continue to grow. In other words, it may be rational to do 
something irrational. It is only rational to be rational when all other market 
participants are rational (Soros 2010). High growth periods might be driven by 
over-optimism and manias among the market participants and create bubbles 
(Kindleberger and Aliber 1978). Similarly, fear might induce cracks in the 
markets, through self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 
While subjects such as physics have universal laws, economic laws are only valid 
under limited circumstances. Economic phenomena have thinking participants, 
natural phenomena don’t. The thinking, or behavior, of the participants introduces 
an element of uncertainty that is absent in natural phenomena (Soros 2010).  
 
2.3 – The behavioral paradigm 
The literature sets the behavioral approach up against the non-behavioral 
approach. However, the two approaches must not necessarily be competing. 
Different perspectives may complement each other. Looking at figure 2.1, you 
could ask yourself if the mountain is slack or steep. From A’s perspective it looks 
like the mountain is slack, but from B’s perspective it looks steep. Which 
perspective is the right one? Obviously, neither A or B’s perspective alone would 
give a good answer. Both behavioral and non-behavioral approaches may be 
necessary to get a good understanding of the asymmetric volatility and other 
qualities of the financial markets. Each approach may be useful depending on the 
problem under investigation (Stracca 2004).  
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Figure 2.1: Complementing perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) developed the concept of paradigms (Okasha 2002). A 
paradigm consists of a set of fundamental assumptions and theories that are 
accepted by the scientific community. The paradigm also affects study subjects, 
methodology and acceptable solutions. According to Kuhn, normal scientists do 
not test the paradigm, but simply accept the paradigm unconditionally and 
conduct their research within its limitations. Like all other sciences, finance also 
takes place in a specific period of time and is constantly evolving. Today’s 
paradigm of finance makes us able to perceive the subject as we do. However, it 
also represents the limitations of our ability to fully understand the subject.  
 
Research on behavioral finance is a rapidly growing field. The behavioral 
approach may be difficult to test and runs the risk of being unparsimonious 
(Tirole 2002). Can the behavioral approach explain aggregated market prices? 
Thaler (1999, 2000) predicts that Homo Economicus, the normative rational 
human model, will evolve into Homo Sapiens. He also postulates that economists 
will incorporate as much behavior into their models as they see in the real world, 
since doing otherwise would be irrational.  
 
2.4 – Behavioral concepts 
2.4-1 Prospect theory 
In his remarkable essay from 1738, Daniel Bernoulli introduced the expected 
utility theory (which he originally called “moral expectation”). This well-known 
theory tries to explain the relationship between the desirability of money (utility) 
and the actual amount of money. Bernoulli observed that most people are risk 
averse and that the risk aversion decreases with increasing wealth, and he pointed 
out that people often do not value uncertain prospects by their expected value 
(Kahneman 2011). The theory has been generally accepted as a normative model 
Master Thesis – GRA 19003   September 2nd, 2013 
Page 9 
of rational choice, and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic 
behavior (Plous 1993; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
 
Today, nearly 300 years later, this theory is still the prevailing one within 
financial economics. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that this 
theory is seriously flawed. Further, they claim that the expected utility theory is 
not an adequate descriptive model. They introduce the alternative descriptive 
theory “prospect theory”, based on how individuals actually behave under 
decision-making involving risk. Instead of states of wealth, the prospect theory 
focuses on changes in wealth. When directly compared or weighted against each 
other, losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman 2011). The loss aversion ratio has 
been estimated in several experiments and is usually in the range of 1.5-2.5. Given 
a loss aversion ratio of for example two, people will require an upside twice of the 
downside in a gamble tossing a coin, in order to accept the gamble. Loss aversion 
might be an explanation for the asymmetric volatility.  
 
Figure 2.2: A Hypothetical Value Function   
 
The value function shows the (psychological) value of gains and losses (See 
figure 2.2). The graph inhibits two distinct parts, to the right and to the left of the 
reference point. The S-shaped form represents diminishing sensitivity for both 
gains and losses (Kahneman 2011), and it implies that people tend to be risk 
averse when it comes to gains, and risk seeking in the case of losses. Furthermore, 
it shows the loss aversion principle as the curve is a lot steeper in the loss region, 
than in the gain-area. 
 
Kahneman (2011) divides our brain into System 1, which does the fast thinking, 
and the effortful and slower System 2, which does the slow thinking, monitors 
System 1, and maintains control as best it can within its limited resources. 
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Kahneman and Tversky have found that most people would reject a coin toss were 
they could win $150 or lose a $100, even though the expected value of the gamble 
clearly is positive. Kahneman claims that the rejection of this gamble is an act of 
System 2, but the critical inputs are emotional responses that are generated by 
System 1.   
 
An interesting part of the analysis done by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) shows 
that a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles 
that would be unacceptable to him otherwise. In other words, he would be more 
risk seeking than normal. This is an effect that could heavily influence a trader’s 
investment decisions, and it is all about the reference point. In figure 2.3 a), you 
can see the purchase price, P, and the possible outcomes P-L and P+G, with the 
associated psychological values. A stock having declined will be worth P-L if it is 
sold, and has an equal chance of being worth P-2L or P should it be kept. If your 
reference point is still the purchase price you will choose to keep the losing stock. 
The pain of a further loss is less than the pleasure of a recovery back to the 
purchase price, causing the risk seeking behavior.  However, if you are in fact able 
to adjust the reference point to the new, lower, price you would prefer to sell the 
stock. In this case the psychological value of a loss hurts more than the pleasure a 
gain gives you (see figure 2.3 b)), and you would sell the stock since you are loss 
averse. 
 
Figure 2.3: Prospect theory; the importance of the reference point 
a) 
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b) 
  
Figure 2.3 a) and b), illustrating the prospect theory, is a copy of figure 1 from Weber and Camerer (1998), 
and highlights the importance of the reference point, the risk seeking behavior in the domain of loss and the 
risk aversion in the domain of gain. 
 
A value function that exhibits loss aversion predicts that for equal chance gambles 
the investor will always sell the lottery (Weber and Camerer 1998). According to 
Low (2004), loss aversion could translate into a greater responsiveness of 
downside price pressure on raising risk relative to the responsiveness of upside 
price pressure on lowering risk. Prospect theory is one of the behavioral 
explanations we will investigate as a potential explanation for the asymmetric 
pattern in volatility.   
 
2.4-2 Link between psychological value and volatility 
Kahneman’s psychological value graph is drawn based on individuals’ decisions 
in experimental settings. Could prospect theory explain aggregated market data? 
Low’s analysis of the relationship between return and volatility is shown in figure 
2.4 beside Kahneman’s hypothetical value function. Both graphs contain gains 
and losses, i.e. positive and negative return. However, Kahneman’s graph have 
psychological value on the second axis while we find changes in volatility on 
Low’s graph. What is the link between psychological value and volatility? The 
psychological value or the perception of gains and losses is one important element 
that could affect the investors’ decisions. In Kahneman’s experiments he has 
observed the participants’ decisions and secondarily drawn the graph of the 
participants’ psychological value. Decisions are observable, psychological value 
is not. However, the psychological value is the factor driving the decision in the 
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experiments. Hence, psychological value could affect decisions and the decisions 
are driving the stock prices in the markets and determine the volatility.  
 
Figure 2.4: Similarities between return, volatility and psychological value.  
   
 
The left graph is a copy of Low’s graph (Low 2004, page 535) and shows the relationship between % change 
in the VIX-index and return of S&P 100. The broken line represent regression Δ VIXt = α + β1 (R-)t  and       
Δ VIXt = α + β1 (R+)t  and the solid line represent regression Δ VIXt = α + β1 (R-)t + β2 (R-)
2
t and                  
Δ VIXt = α + β1 (R-)t + β2 (R-)
2
t for positive and negative returns respectively. The regressions are similar to 
regression 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 and 5.7 in our analysis and are explained in detail in section “5.3 Testing of prospect 
theory”.  The graph to the right is “The hypothetical value function” and is explained in section 2.4-1 as well 
as section 5.3.  
 
 
 
Return and volatility are related in the markets. Could a behavioral explanation 
explain the asymmetric volatility? What is in the black box? It must necessarily be 
some kind of action or absence of action, because perception itself do not affect 
volatility. However, psycological value could affect decisions, and decisions 
affect stock prices and market volatility.  
 
 
 
 
2.4-3 Disposition effect 
Another behavioral explanation for the asymmetric volatility, found in the existing 
literature, is the “disposition effect”. It is defined as “the tendency of investors to 
ride losses and realize gains” (Boujelbène 2011), and is closely related to prospect 
Return  Psychological value Volatility  
Return  Black Box Volatility  
Decision  
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theory. This effect was first found by Shefrin and Statman (1985), who examined 
decisions related to realizing gains and losses in a market setting. The effect has 
also been found in the market by Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), and by Weber 
and Camerer (1998) in an experimental setting.  
 
According to Shefrin and Statman (1985), there exist four distinct elements that 
contribute to the disposition effect. That is, prospect theory, mental accounting, 
aversion to regret and self-control. As seen in figure 2.3 a), prospect theory 
predicts a behavior where investors sell winners and ride losers. This is due to the 
fixed reference point and the s-shaped valuation function. Mental accounting, a 
concept named by Thaler (1980), suggests that people tend to categorize, code and 
evaluate economic outcomes into different mental accounts. When a stock is 
purchased, for example, a new mental account is opened. The reference point will 
naturally be the purchase price, and a running score will be kept on this account, 
indicating gains or losses relative to the purchase price. Since people are reluctant 
to close a mental account with a loss, they will keep on to the stock until it has 
gained relative to the original purchase price. Mental accounting also helps 
explain why an investor is likely to refrain from readjusting his reference point for 
a stock (Shefrin and Statman 1985). Aversion to regret provides an important 
reason as to why investors may have difficulty with realizing both gains and 
losses. Lastly, self-control is an element investors employ in order to force 
themselves to realize losses, and thereby reducing the magnitude of the 
disposition effect. 
 
For the purpose of explaining asymmetric volatility, we postulate that the 
asymmetry is caused by the changes in traded volume, triggered by the movement 
in prices. In the presence of investors subject to disposition effect, the market 
would be very liquid for winner stocks, and less liquid for loser stocks. 
Consequently, a demand shock would have a greater impact on the volatility of a 
loser stock, than of a winner stock (Boujelbène 2011). Hence, according to 
existing theory, negative returns are related to an increase in volatility and vice 
versa. We hypothesize that mental accounting, as well as prospect theory and 
regret aversion leads to a disposition effect in the market, and will formally test 
this in our analysis. 
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2.4-4 Similarities between prospect theory and disposition effect  
In one of Kahneman’s experiments (Kahneman 2011) he asked people what they 
would choose between winning 900 for sure or gamble with 90% probability of 
winning 1000.  The participants also got the choice of losing 900 for sure or 
gamble with 90% probability of losing 1000. People tend to choose the certain 
alternative when confronted with the winning scenario and gamble in the loss 
scenario. The experiment reflects that people tend to be risk averse when it comes 
to gains, and risk seeking in the case of losses. Kahneman’s hypothetical value 
function is convex in the domain of loss and concave in the domain of gain. This 
S-shape reflects the diminishing sensitivity of both gains and losses. In a situation 
where you have gained a lot, winning even more gives you relatively little 
increased value, psychologically. This reflects the risk aversion in the positive 
domain. In the case of a big loss, you would experience a severe pain, and losing 
even more would give you relatively little in additional pain. This reflects the risk 
seeking behavior in the domain of loss. 
 
In the stock market an increasing stock price would represent a gain and a 
decreasing stock price would represent a loss. If people behave according to 
Kahneman’s theory they would be risk averse when the stock goes up and risk 
seeking when the stock goes down. Selling represents the certain alternative and 
staying in the market represents the gamble. This implies that people would tend 
to sell winners and keep on to their loosing stocks. This is exactly the same 
behavior as predicted by the disposition effect, where people tend to realize gains 
and ride losses. 
 
Disposition effect could be seen as a manifestation of the prospect theory. But, at 
the same time, disposition effect is only one of the implications of prospect 
theory. Weber and Camerer (1998) point out that any test for disposition effects 
also tests the joint hypothesis of the prospect theory. 
 
2.4-5 The heuristics; affect, representativeness and the extrapolation bias 
The representativeness and affect heuristics as well as the extrapolation bias 
(described by Shefrin 2007) are other psychological phenomena that may explain 
the asymmetric volatility.  
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The affect heuristic could lead managers to base decisions on instinct rather than a 
formal analysis, due to emotional associations with activities or positive/negative 
labels assigned to images, objects or concepts. Positive affect is related to labeling 
something as good and negative affect is related to labeling something as bad. 
Investors could for example label a decreasing stock as a bad stock. These labels 
have a strong influence on people’s decisions (Shefrin 2007). People often base 
their decisions on affect heuristics rather than on an explicit analysis. 
 
The representativeness heuristic leads managers to think of stocks of good 
companies as representative of good stocks, leading managers to expect higher 
returns from safer stocks. Representativeness affects investors to predict lower 
future volatility when market return has been high in the previous period (Shefrin 
2007). Both the affect and representativeness reinforce each other when it comes 
to risk and return. Both lead managers to view the relationship between risk and 
return as being negative (as opposed to standard financial theory).  
 
The extrapolation bias regards how people tend to give too much weight to the 
most recent events. The extrapolation bias is also called “the hot hand fallacy”, 
overweighting past trends when forming forecasts. All the three heuristics have in 
common that they affect investors to believe that recent trends in the stock market 
will continue.  
 
Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet (2008, 2257) postulates that “market returns 
influence the fear and exuberance of investors such that negative returns create 
fears of additional declines in the market, while positive returns create the 
exuberance of potential additional increases in the market, i.e. the 
representativeness associated with the momentum effects.” They suggest that 
representativeness, the affect heuristic and the extrapolation bias causes 
asymmetric volatility. 
 
Prospect theory and the disposition effect, as well as representativeness, the affect 
heuristic and the extrapolation bias have all been linked to the asymmetric pattern 
in volatility. We will further analyze how adequately these behavioral 
explanations can explain the asymmetry in volatility. 
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3. Methodology 
In this section we will outline the methodology we will use to test our theories and 
hypotheses. 
 
3.1 - GARCH 
We will apply the GJR GARCH model developed by Glosten, Jaganathan and 
Runkle (1993) to test for asymmetric volatility in the Norwegian stock market. 
After running the conditional mean equation (See equation 3.1), we will use the 
estimated residuals further in the conditional variance equation (See equation 3.2). 
This period’s volatility is dependent on the estimated α1 and β, indicating the 
importance of the last period’s shock and last periods’ volatility respectively. 
Compared to the original GARCH model, the GJR GARCH contains a dummy 
variable that is activated when the last period shock is negative. In case of 
negative returns the dummy variable will be activated and lead to higher 
conditional variance, than in the case of a positive return. A significant positive γ 
will indicate the asymmetric pattern in volatility, where negative shocks leads to 
higher conditional volatility.  
 
yt = μ + φyt-1 + ut        (3.1) 
σ2t = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + βσ
2
t-1 + γu
2
t-1It-1      (3.2) 
where It-1 = 1 if ut-1 < 0, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2 – The leverage hypothesis, the feedback hypothesis and the heuristics 
3.2-1 The leverage hypothesis 
According to the leverage hypothesis a falling stock will lead to an increased debt 
to equity ratio and with increased risk the stock gets more volatile (Brooks 2008). 
We will classify the stocks in the OBX-index as low, medium or high leveraged, 
based on their debt to equity ratio. Further, we will run a GJR GARCH for each 
leverage group. According to the leverage hypothesis, we would expect more 
asymmetric volatility in groups with higher leverage.  
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3.2-2 The heuristics, the feedback hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis  
Volatility tends to increase when markets fall and decrease when markets rise. 
The negative correlation is illustrated in figure 3.1. According to the leverage 
hypothesis, the leverage increases when a stock falls and this causes higher 
volatility. On the other hand, the feedback hypothesis postulates that increased 
volatility causes higher expected return, leading the stock price to decrease. Both 
effects involves a negative correlation between return and volatility, but with 
opposite causality. In contrast to a behavioral explanation based on heuristics, 
both the leverage and the feedback effects are longer-term lagged effects (Hibbert, 
Daigler and Dupoyet 2008). In other words, while the behavioral effect is more 
immediate, the non-behavioral explanations are more persistent.  
 
Figure 3.1: The negative return-volatility relationship.  
 
Earlier studies of asymmetric volatility and the negative correlation between 
volatility and return have used the Implied Volatility index on the S&P 500 (VIX) 
(See for example Low 2004 or Hibbert, Daigler and Dupoyet 2008). Bollen and 
Whely (2004) found that changes in implied volatility of S&P 500 options are 
most strongly affected by buying pressure for index puts. The heuristics affect 
investors to believe that existing trends will last. However, in falling markets this 
would affect the prices of both put and call options. The strong buying pressure 
for index puts and the increased implied volatility might be a result of the 
heuristics in combination with the effect of loss aversion or downside fear.  
 
We will in our study use the implied volatility on the OBX-index as a proxy for 
the volatility in the market and use linear regression to test the heuristics, the 
leverage hypothesis and the feedback hypothesis (See equation 3.3). Rt is the 
current period’s return on the OBX-index.  
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Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 Rt + β2 Rt-1 + β3 Rt-2 + β4 Rt+1 + β5 Rt+2 + εt   (3.3)  
 
Significant lagged effects would support the leverage hypothesis and significant 
lead effects would support the feedback hypothesis. If the lagged and lead effects 
are weak or not significant, this contradicts the leverage and the feedback 
hypothesis respectively and potentially supports a behavioral explanation. In other 
words, a weak or insignificant β2, β3, β4, and β5 compared to β1, will indicate that 
the leverage hypothesis and the feedback hypothesis are not fully able to explain 
asymmetric volatility. A strong and significant β1 would support the heuristic 
explanations.  
 
3.3 –Prospect theory 
According to prospect theory people are generally loss aversive, risk seeking in 
the domain of loss and risk averse in the domain of gain. The theory has been 
widely explored and confirmed in experimental settings with single individuals. 
The question is whether the same patterns also could be found in aggregated 
market data. Based on the hypothetical value function, we have derived three 
empirical implications: (1) Positive and negative returns would have a 
significantly different impact on the implied volatility; (2) negative return will 
increase implied volatility more than positive return decreases volatility; and (3) 
there would be a significantly non- linear relationship between implied volatility 
and return. To test the prospect theory we will employ a relatively similar 
approach as Low (2004). The hypothesis and regressions will be outlined and 
explained in detail in section 5.3. 
 
3.4 – Disposition effect  
In our testing of a disposition effect in the OBX-index, we will use a similar 
approach as Lakonishok and Smidt (1986). We will collect daily trading volume 
and shares outstanding on all the companies listed on the OBX-index. From these 
figures we will compute the daily turnover for each of the shares and for the 
market portfolio (see eq. 3.4). These variables will further be used in regression 
3.5 to compute the daily abnormal turnover for each stock. Here, the daily 
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turnover for each stock is the dependent variable and the daily market turnover is 
the independent variable. 
 
Daily turnoverit = Daily volumeit / shares outstandingit   (3.4) 
VTit = αi + βi VTMt + εit       (3.5) 
 
Since we are regressing the individual stock’s turnover against the market 
turnover, the residuals in equation 3.5 will represent the abnormal turnover for 
each stock. The abnormal turnover will be positive if the particular stock had a 
higher turnover than the market, and vice versa. Further, we will use regression 
3.6 to test for a disposition effect in the market. In other words, we will test if the 
abnormal turnover can be explained by the movement in prices, as predicted by 
the disposition effect. A binary variable will be generated in order to define a 
winner/loser stock, and be regressed against the dependent variable, the abnormal 
turnover. We will test this with different definitions of winner/loser stocks in 
order to capture different holding periods. Regression 3.6 shows the particular 
regression that will be run for each of the holding periods. AVTit is the abnormal 
turnover of security i on day t and DNit is a binary variable for security i on day t, 
receiving the value of 1 if Pt > Pt-N and 0 otherwise. 
 
AVTit = αi + βi DNit + εit       (3.6) 
 
Other authors, such as Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) have tested and found 
the disposition effect for smaller companies. A sample of smaller companies will 
potentially ease the likelihood of finding a disposition effect since these 
companies inhibit a higher volatility. However, we want to test if we can find the 
disposition effect in the OBX-index. In the case that winner stocks and loser 
stocks exhibit different trading volumes, this could lead to different reactions to 
demand shocks causing the asymmetric volatility. Hence, the relationship should 
be the following: 
 
Price down (up)  turnover down (up)   volatility up (down).  
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4. Data 
4.1 The OBX-index 
We have collected daily values on single stocks and the OBX-index from the OBI 
database for the period 2002 to 2011. The OBX-index consists of the 25 most 
liquid stocks on Oslo Stock Exchange. Returns on single stocks are raw return 
adjusted for dividends and other corporate events, like stock dividends and stock 
splits. The negative relationship between return and volatility can be seen visually 
(See figure 4.1). We could observe from the two graphs that the volatility 
increases during drops in the stock market, as for example in 2008. 
 
Figure 4.1: Development in the OBX-index from 2002 to 2011. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the largest negative daily return on the OBX-
index was -10.66%, whereas the largest positive return was 11.65% (See table 
4.1). The changes in the OBX-index have a kurtosis of 5.61 indicating fat tails. 
The mean is below the median and the skewness is -0.34, both indicating more 
extreme negative returns than positive returns. In fact, the two most extreme 
returns are positive, but except from these two days the majority of extreme 
movements are related to negative returns (See table 4.2). One could, for example, 
observe that the number of days exceeding 5% negative return was 30 days, while 
the number of days exceeding 5% positive return was only 19 days. 
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Table 4.1:  Descriptive statistics of the OBX-index 2002 to 2011. 
Δ OBX OBX
Mean 0.05% 272.85
Median 0.14% 286.28
Min -10.66% 95.34
Max 11.65% 462.70
Kurtosis 5.61 -1.29
Skewnes -0.34 -0.12
Obs 2514 2514  
 
Table 4.2: Number of days with large changes on the OBX-index 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A GJR GARCH showed asymmetry in the returns for the OBX-index in the 
period 2002 – 2011 (See table 4.3). The coefficients reported in the table are the 
asymmetric dummy terms. To check for market cyclical patterns in the 
asymmetric volatility we ran the model on a yearly basis. With the exception of 
2003, all years showed a significant negative asymmetric pattern in volatility. We 
do not find any specific differences in asymmetric volatility in bull and bear 
markets. 
 
Table 4.3: Asymmetry on the OBX-index from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Coefficient P-value
2002-2011 0.1369 0.0000
2002 0.0538 0.0000
2003 0.0105 0.6009
2004 0.2137 0.0001
2005 0.2112 0.0000
2006 0.2593 0.0000
2007 0.2176 0.0006
2008 0.1232 0.0063
2009 0.1435 0.0004
2010 0.2540 0.0000
2011 0.1296 0.0000
Limit # Positive # Negative Limit # Positive # Negative
2 % 226 230 7 % 7 11
3 % 83 103 8 % 4 10
4 % 33 52 9 % 3 4
5 % 19 30 10 % 2 1
6 % 13 19 11 % 2 0
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4.2 Implied volatility 
Oslo Børs has also provided us with data on the implied volatility on the OBX-
index. The implied volatility is derived indirectly from prices on put and call 
options on the OBX-index, using the Black & Scholes option pricing model. The 
variable indicates the expected volatility in the underlying index over the next 30 
days, represented by an annualized standard deviation. Our data is relatively 
similar to the “Uro”–index reported in Dagens Næringsliv or the VIX-index on 
the S&P 500. The VIX- index have also been called “the fear gauge” or “the 
sentiment index” by the wall Street Journal ( Low 2004), since it bursts up when 
the markets are falling and investors experience losses and uncertainty. Implied 
volatility captures the markets expectation of future volatility, in contrast to 
historical measures of volatility (Hibbert 2008). We also avoid potentially 
statistical errors as sampling error and misspecification errors. Similar to the 
bursts in volatility on the OBX-index in bear markets (See figure 4.1), the implied 
volatility also rises in falling markets, as for example in 2008 (See figure 4.2). In 
the turmoil during the fall of 2008, the implied volatility reaches its top of 87% 
and we also find the maximum change of 32.66% and the most negative change of 
-19.17% in this period (See table 4.4). The correlation between changes in implied 
volatility and changes in the OBX- index was 65% in the period 2002-2011. 
 
Figure 4.2: Implied volatility on the OBX-index from 2002 to 2011. 
  
 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of implied volatility on OBX from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
Δ Implied volatility OBX Implied volatility OBX
Mean 0.9 % 25 %
Median -0.18 % 22 %
Min -19.17 % 14 %
Max 32.66 % 87 %
Kurtosis 5.86 8.44
Skewnes 1.00 2.39
Obs 2489 2490
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4.3 Daily Turnover 
From the OBI database we also collected data on shares outstanding and daily 
volume for the 25 companies listed on the OBX-Index. From this data we 
constructed a daily turnover variable for all the 25 companies. This variable was 
used to compute a daily abnormal turnover variable for each of the companies. 
Table 4.5 shows that the average daily turnover ranges from a low 0.19% for “Det 
Norske Oljeselskap” to a high of 1.83% for “Marine Harvest”. We will use the 
daily turnover data in our test of the disposition effect.  
 
Table 4.5: Daily turnover for OBX companies from 2002 – 2011 
Company name Avg. daily turnover St.dev 
Aker Solutions 0.66% 0.60% 
Algeta 0.41% 0.80% 
Det norske Oljeselskap 0.19% 0.68% 
DNB 0.37% 0.28% 
DNO International 1.39% 2.08% 
Electromagnetic Geoservices 0.47% 1.62% 
Fred. Olsen Energy 0.44% 0.48% 
Gjensidige Forsikring 0.20% 0.42% 
Marine Harvest (Pan Fish) 1.83% 3.06% 
Nopec International 0.86% 0.81% 
Norsk Hydro 0.60% 0.35% 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 0.47% 0.85% 
Orkla 0.37% 0.31% 
Petroleum Geo-Services 1.33% 1.28% 
ProSafe 0.56% 0.91% 
Renewable Energy Corporation 1.12% 1.01% 
Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCCL) 0.27% 0.29% 
Schibsted 0.31% 0.27% 
Seadrill 0.95% 0.99% 
Songa Offshore 1.09% 1.70% 
Statoil 0.44% 0.38% 
Storebrand 0.61% 0.69% 
Subsea 7 (Stolt Comex Seaway) 0.80% 1.22% 
Telenor 0.36% 0.42% 
Yara International 0.93% 0.95% 
MARKET 0.75% 0.66% 
Table 4.5 shows the average daily turnover, standard deviation and the number of days with trade for each of 
the 25 companies and for the total index. The total sample is based on a period of 10 years, from 2002-2011.  
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5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Testing of the leverage hypothesis 
5.1-1 The leverage hypothesis 
The leverage hypothesis states that negative returns increase the leverage of the 
stock, and with more leverage, i.e. more risk, the stock gets more volatile. To test 
this hypothesis we will group the OBX stocks into three groups, based on their 
debt to equity ratio. According to the hypothesis, we would expect more leveraged 
firms to have a higher degree of asymmetric volatility. We estimated a GJR 
GARCH for the individual years from 2007 to 2011 as well as for the whole 
sample period, rebalancing the stocks each year to account for changes in their 
debt to equity ratio.  
 
5.1-2 Results of the leverage hypothesis 
The dummy coefficients have to be significantly larger for a group with higher 
leverage to support the leverage hypothesis. Our results are mixed and often 
contradicting the leverage hypothesis (See table 5.1). For instance, in 2010, the 
asymmetric dummy coefficient is 0.32 for the group with medium leverage and 
0.17 for the group with high leverage. Since the asymmetric volatility is lower for 
the group with the highest leverage we clearly have to reject that the coefficient is 
significantly higher. All the estimated coefficients marked with a grey shaded 
background are contradicting the leverage hypothesis. Consistent with earlier 
studies in our literature review, we conclude that the leverage hypothesis at best 
could be a weak explanation for the asymmetric volatility. 
 
H1: Stocks with high leverage will have higher asymmetric volatility. 
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Table 5.1: Leverage and asymmetric volatility. 
Leverage 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007-2011
Low 0.1667** 0.2192*** 0.0645 0.3305*** 0.1851*** 0.1475***
(0.0243) (0.0056) (0.2490) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Medium 0.2313*** 0.2793*** 0.0307 0.3223*** 0.1876*** 0.1407***
(0.0049) (0.0030) (0.5554) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000)
High 0.2506** 0.2719*** 0.1619** 0.1750*** 0.2456*** 0.1207***
(0.0209) (0.0014) (0.0427) (0.0080) (0.0005) (0.0000)  
Table 5.1 shows the γ coefficient from the GJR GARCH model (σ2t = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + βσ
2
t-1 + γu
2
t-1It-1), 
measuring the asymmetric volatility. The p-values are given in parenthesis in the table. The sample consists 
of stocks included in the OBX-index at the beginning of 2013. The stocks are grouped as low, medium and 
high leverage based on their debt to equity ratio each year. * Indicates statistical significance at a 10% level, 
** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
 
5.1-3 Discussion of the leverage hypothesis 
Based on our analysis it seems like the leverage effect at best could be a weak 
explanation for the asymmetric volatility. However, other potential factors might 
be dominating and disturb our results. Based on our analysis, we cannot determine 
if there is a small leverage effect or none at all. However, we do know that the 
leverage effect is not the dominating explanation for the asymmetric volatility. 
We will investigate the leverage hypothesis further in the next section by also 
testing the theory in a multiple regression.  
 
5.2 Testing of the heuristics; representativeness, affect and extrapolation bias, 
the feedback hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis  
5.2-1 The heuristics; representativeness, affect and extrapolation bias 
According to traditional financial theory there is a positive relation between risk 
and return. A stock with higher risk has higher expected return. The heuristics are 
“rules of thumb” or “mental shortcuts” used instead of more explicit analyses. The 
affect and representativeness heuristics leads investors to believe low risk will 
give high return, i.e. a negative risk-return relationship. Current negative return 
affects investors negatively emotionally and the falling market is viewed as 
representative for the future. Extrapolation bias affects investors to extrapolate 
recent trends when forming future forecasts. People will be overly optimistic in 
bull markets and overly pessimistic in bear markets. All the three heuristics affects 
investors to believe that recent trends will last in the near future. Bollen and 
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Whaley (2004) find that changes in implied volatility are directly related to net 
buying pressure from public order flow. They find that changes in implied 
volatility of S&P 500 options are most strongly affected by buying pressure for 
index puts. In falling markets, investors would buy put options for hedging and 
speculations in a much higher degree than they would buy call options in rising 
markets. Hence, the implied volatility would increase. This would lead to a 
negative risk-return relationship. The increased implied volatility related to rising 
put prices might be a result of the heuristics as well as loss aversion or downside 
fear. 
 
We will use regression 5.1 to test the heuristics; representativeness, affect and 
extrapolation bias, as well as the feedback hypothesis and the leverage hypothesis. 
The model includes current, lagged and lead returns to explain the current implied 
volatility.  
 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 Rt + β2 Rt-1 + β3 Rt-2 + β4 Rt+1 + β5 Rt+2 + εt         (5.1)   
 
H1: Current return on the OBX-index is the most important factor 
determining the contemporary implied volatility (Supports the heuristics and 
contradicts feedback and leverage).  
5.2-2 The feedback effect and the leverage effect 
The feedback effect is a market effect, in contrast to the leverage effect that is a 
firm effect (Dennis et al. 2006). According to the feedback hypothesis, increased 
volatility in the stock market causes higher expected return, meaning that the 
volatility is the primary effect and the returns are secondary. The leverage effect 
has an opposite causation. Negative return increases the firm’s leverage and this 
causes increased volatility, i.e. the return is primary and the volatility is 
secondary.  
 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between lagged returns and 
contemporary implied volatility (Supports leverage hypothesis). 
 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between lead returns and 
contemporary implied volatility (Supports feedback hypothesis). 
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5.2-3 Results of the heuristics, feedback and leverage 
The data supports the affect, representativeness and extrapolation bias heuristics. 
Hypothesis H1, “current return on the OBX-index is the most important factor 
determining the contemporary implied volatility”, is supported by the data. 
Current return (Rt), with an estimated coefficient of -1.53, is the dominating factor 
determining the implied volatility, compared to the other estimated coefficients 
(See table 5.2). Falling stock markets will affect investors to believe it will 
continue to fall. Hence, put option prices will increase (protecting investors from 
further losses), reflecting the expectations of future increased volatility. The 
significant negative and dominating current return coefficient reflects the negative 
contemporary relationship between return and volatility. 
 
Table 5.2: Heuristics, feedback and leverage. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 shows the results from regression 5.1: Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 Rt + β2 Rt-1 + β3 Rt-2 + β4 Rt+1 + 
β5 Rt+2 + εt. The model is relatively similar to Hibbert et al. (2008). Change in the implied volatility of the 
OBX-index is dependent variable for regression 5.1 and R is the return of the OBX-index. There is a 10 year 
sample period from 2002 to 2011.The t-values are given in parenthesis in the table. * indicates statistical 
significance at a 1% level. 
 
We find some evidence consistent with the leverage hypothesis while the 
feedback hypothesis is mainly contradicted by our analysis. However, the 
leverage hypothesis does not have a dominating explanatory role in determining 
the asymmetric volatility. Current return (Rt) is the dominating factor determining 
the implied volatility, supporting hypothesis H1 (See table 5.2). Since both the 
leverage effect and the feedback effect are related to longer term lagged and lead 
effects, the strong effect from current return is contradicting that the leverage and 
the feedback effects are the main explanations for the asymmetric volatility. 
Hypothesis H2, “there is a significant negative relationship between lagged 
returns and contemporary implied volatility”, is partly supported by our data. The 
one day lag is statistically significant, supporting the leverage hypothesis. 
Hypothesis H3, “there is a significant negative relationship between lead returns 
and contemporary implied volatility”, is contradicted by our data. Both the one 
and two days lead are insignificant contradicting the feedback hypothesis. Overall 
Regression Adj R2 Intercept Rt Rt-1 Rt-2 Rt+1 Rt+2
Reg 5.1 0.4276 0.0017* -1.5328* -0.1722* -0.0163 -0.0496 0.0223
(2.7595) (-42.8412) (-4.8146) (-0.4574) (-1.3871) (0.6232)
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our result shows no support for the feedback hypothesis, while the leverage 
hypothesis is at best a weak explanation for the asymmetric volatility.  
 
5.2-4 Conclusion on the heuristics, feedback and leverage 
The multiple regression model shows that the contemporary return is the 
dominating effect determining the implied volatility. Our analysis shows no 
support for the feedback hypothesis, while the leverage hypothesis is at best a 
weak explanation for the asymmetric volatility. This indicates that these rational 
theories are not the primary explanations for the asymmetric volatility. Our data 
are consistent with the heuristics; representativeness, affect and extrapolation bias.  
 
5.3 Testing of prospect theory  
5.3-1 Prospect theory 
The hypothetical value function (See figure 2.2) has three empirical implications: 
(1) Positive and negative returns would have a significantly different impact on 
the implied volatility; (2) negative return will increase implied volatility more 
than positive return decreases volatility; and (3) there would be a significantly 
non- linear relationship between implied volatility and return. The sample is based 
on the implied volatility on the OBX- index and the return on the OBX-index 
using daily data. (R+) consist of the whole sample removing all negative values 
and (R-) is the same sample removing all positive values.  
 
5.3-2 Loss aversion 
The first implication is derived from the reference point of the hypothetical value 
function. We expect to find a break point, i.e. that the two samples (reg. 5.3 and 
5.4) with negative and positive returns would have significantly different slopes. 
To test the incremental effects we would run regression 5.5, which includes both 
regression 5.3 and 5.4. A significant β3 from regression 5.5 would indicate that the 
market reacts differently to gains and losses, consistent with the hypothesis. The 
second implication is related to the statement “losses loom larger than gains”. 
Loss aversion is expected to materialize with a steeper slope for the negative 
sample.  
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Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 Rt + εt     (5.2) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R-)t + εt    (5.3) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R+)t + εt    (5.4) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (D+)t + β2 Rt + β3 Rt (D+) + εt  (5.5) 
where (D+) = 1 if Rt ≥ 0, 0 otherwise 
 
H1: Due to the reference point, changes in volatility should be significantly 
different for positive and negative returns.  
 
H2: Due to loss aversion, the increase in volatility following negative return 
should be greater than the decrease in volatility following positive return.  
 
5.3-3 Risk seeking and risk aversion 
The third implication would be supported if we find a significant positive 
coefficient related to (R-)2 and a significant negative coefficient related to (R+)2 
(See regression 5.6 to 5.9). A positive coefficient related to (R-)2 implies a 
positive second derivative related to the negative sample and a negative 
coefficient related to (R+)2 implies a negative second derivative related to the 
positive sample. This will imply the S-shape where negative return would have an 
exponentially increasing effect on implied volatility and positive return would 
have an exponentially diminishing effect on the reduction in implied volatility.  
 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R-)t + β2 (R-)
2
t + εt   (5.6) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R+)t + β2 (R+)
2
t + εt   (5.7) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R-)
2
t + εt    (5.8) 
Δ Implied Volatilityt = α + β1 (R+)
2
t + εt    (5.9) 
 
H3: Due to risk seeking in the domain of loss, the increase in volatility should 
be exponentially increasing (Convex function).  
 
H4: Due to risk aversion in the domain of gain, the decrease in volatility 
should be exponentially decreasing (Concave function). 
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5.3-4 Results of prospect theory 
Regression 5.2 has a significant negative beta coefficient of -1.53 reflecting the 
negative relationship between return and volatility (See table 5.3-1). When return 
goes up with one percent the implied volatility is expected to go down with 1.53 
percent. In fact, all the linear slope coefficients in regression 5.2 to 5.7 are 
significantly negative, reflecting the negative relationship between return and 
volatility. 
 
Our analysis supports hypothesis H1 and H2, reflecting the reference point and the 
loss aversion of prospect theory, respectively (See table 5.3-1). The negative 
sample has a slope coefficient of -1.86 and the positive sample has a slope 
coefficient of -1.13 (See reg. 5.3 and 5.4). The steeper slope related to losses 
reflects that losses looms larger than gains and supports hypothesis H2. Adjusted 
R2 for the negative sample is 38% and for the positive sample 16%. The higher 
adjusted R2 for the negative sample also reflects the greater relationship between 
return and volatility for negative returns. We use regression 5.5 to determine 
whether the two effects are significantly different. Regression 5.5 incorporates 
both regression 5.3 and 5.4. When there is negative return both the dummy 
variables are inactive. Hence, the constant and the slope coefficient of regression 
5.5 are similar to regression 5.3. For positive returns the dummy variables are 
activated and we get the same coefficients for regression 5.5 as for regression 5.4 
(-0.0026 + - 0.0004 = -0.0030 and -1.8649 + 0.7301 = -1.1348). The significant 
slope dummy coefficient of 0.73 reflects that the markets react significantly 
different to gains and losses, and supports hypothesis H1 and the reference point 
aspect of prospect theory. 
 
Hypothesis H3 and H4, reflecting the risk seeking behavior in the domain of loss 
and the risk aversion in the domain of gain are supported by our analysis (See 
table 5.3-1). For the negative sample we expected a positive coefficient related to 
(R-)2 (see reg. 5.6 and 5.8) and for the positive sample we expected a negative 
coefficient related to (R+)2 (See reg. 5.7 and 5.9). The signs of our estimated 
coefficients in regression 5.6 and 5.7 are opposite to our expectations and not 
significant. Testing for multicollinearity we got a VIF- value of 6.29 and 3.89 for 
the negative and positive sample, respectively. To avoid the multicollinearity 
problem we estimated regression 5.8 and 5.9. The estimated coefficients have 
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signs as expected and show a significant non-linear relationship, supporting 
hypothesis H3 and H4. 
 
Excluding a relevant variable from a regression might lead to biased estimates, i.e. 
the squared terms might be biased excluding the linear terms in regression 5.8 and 
5.9. However, we are mostly concerned about the significance level and not the 
values of the estimated coefficients. The reason that the squared terms are not 
significant in regression 5.6 and 5.7 is that the linear effect is the dominating one. 
In other words, it seems like loss aversion, i.e. that people don’t like to lose, is a 
more fundamental effect than the risk seeking behavior in the domain of loss and 
the risk aversion in the domain of gains. 
 
Table 5.3-1: Prospect theory. Sample 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3-1 shows the estimated coefficients and their respective t-values in parenthesis for regression 5.2 to 
5.9, using daily data from 2002 to 2011. The implied volatility on the OBX- index is dependent variable and 
the independent variables consist of return on the OBX-index. R represents the whole sample, (R+) consist of 
the whole sample removing all negative values and (R-) is the whole sample removing all positive values. 
The dummy is activated for positive returns. The t-values are given in parenthesis in the table. * indicates 
statistical significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Regression Constant R R- R+ (R-)2 (R+)2 Dummy Dummy*R Adj R2
Reg 5.2 0.0016*** -1.5298*** 0.4222
(2.5804) (-42.602)
Reg 5.3 -0.0026** -1.8632*** 0.3811
(-1.9707) (-26.470)
Reg 5.4 -0.0030*** -1.1348*** 0.1621
(-2.6047) (-16.153)
Reg 5.5 -0.0026** -1.8649*** -0.0004 0.7301*** 0.4341
(-2.0946) (-27.639) (-0.2146) (7.3482)
Reg 5.6 -0.0039** -2.0465*** -2.9671 0.3815
(-2.3464) (-12.871) (-1.2852)
Reg 5.7 -0.0018 -1.3015*** 2.8685 0.1627
(-1.3017) (-9.3906) (1.3949)
Reg 5.8 0.0130*** 23.6800*** 0.2917
(11.74385) (21.6571)
Reg 5.9 -0.0126*** -13.7801*** 0.1083
(-14.0189) (-12.8139)
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5.3-5 Time variation of prospect theory 
Further, we want to test if prospect theory has a different explanatory power in 
bull and bear markets. Boujelbene (2011) concludes that during the subprime 
crisis a behavioral explanation was more important for the asymmetric volatility, 
compared to the pre-subprime crisis period. We have estimated regression 5.3 to 
5.5 each of the individual years in the 10 years period from 2002 to 2011, testing 
for stability over time (See table 5.3-2). The relationship between return and 
implied volatility for the positive sample in 2003 was actually positive. However, 
the relationship was weak and non- significant. Despite some lack of significance 
in 2004 and 2007, this analysis mainly supports Hypothesis H1 and H2 and our 
initial conclusions using the whole sample period. Further, we do not find any 
specific pattern related to potential differences between bull and bear markets.  
 
Table 5.3-2: Prospect theory; Reference point and loss aversion, time consistency 
Regression Coefficient 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Reg 5.3 R- -2.5082*** -1.9315*** -1.5095*** -2.3685*** -1.8858*** -2.7427*** -1.7250*** -1.2784*** -2.5745*** -3.1844***
(-8.7506) (-4.9243) (-3.3818) (-7.0948) (-8.8341) (-8.7366) (-11.963) (-9.6466) (-8.9747) (-12.299)
Reg 5.4 R+ -1.6599*** 0.0161 -0.3417 -0.8445*** -1.0950*** -2.2817*** -1.0356*** -0.5614*** -1.7766*** -2.0709***
(-3.8118) (0.0564) (-0.6794) (-3.0238) (-5.5633) (-7.5298) (-6.1120) (-4.0728) (-8.9972) (-7.9792)
Reg 5.5 Dummy*R 0.8483* 1.9476*** 1.1678* 1.5240*** 0.8100*** 0.4663 0.6893*** 0.7169*** 0.7978** 1.1135***
(1.6716) (4.0770) (1.7380) (3.5453) (2.8163) (1.0770) (3.0999) (3.7192) (2.3484) (2.9984)  
Table 5.3-2 shows the estimated coefficients and their respective t-values in parenthesis for regression 5.3 to 
5.5, using daily data from 2002 to 2011. The implied volatility on the OBX- index is dependent variable and 
the independent variables consist of return on the OBX-index. R represents the whole sample, (R+) consist of 
the whole sample removing all negative values and (R-) is the whole sample removing all positive values. 
The dummy is activated for positive returns. The t-values are given in parenthesis in the table. * indicates 
statistical significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
 
We have also estimated regression 5.8 and 5.9 each of the individual years in the 
10 years period from 2002 to 2011, testing for stability over time         
(See table 5.3-3). Low found a relatively strong convex profile for extreme losses 
and a somewhat weaker concave profile for extreme gains (Low 2004). With 
exceptions of 2003 and 2004 in the cases of gains, our result shows the same 
relationship using Norwegian market data, supporting hypothesis H3 and H4. 
Similar to our results in table 5.3-2, we do not find any specific pattern related to 
potential differences between bull and bear markets. 
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Table 5.3-3: Prospect theory; Non- linearity, time consistency.  
 
 
 
Table 5.3-3 shows the estimated coefficients and their respective t-values in parenthesis for regression 5.8 
and 5.9, using daily data from 2002 to 2011. The implied volatility on the OBX- index is dependent variable 
and the independent variables consist of returns on the OBX-index. R represents the whole sample, (R+) 
consist of the whole sample removing all negative values and (R-) is the whole sample removing all positive 
values. The dummy is activated for positive returns. The t-values are given in parenthesis in the table. * 
indicates statistical significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
 
5.3-6 Discussion of loss aversion and causality 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, markets are efficient when the assets 
are correctly priced and reflect all information (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2008). 
Hence, the only thing that drives the stock prices is news. News is per definition 
unpredictable, hence the stock prices are following a random walk. It may be that 
on average more extreme news are following days with negative return than 
positive return. If that is the case, the asymmetric volatility may be a rational 
reflection of reality. It may also be other rational explanations that no-one have 
come up with yet. This is related to what is called an endogeneity problem, and 
could never be ruled out.  
 
We would use Hume’s classical example of the billiard table to enlighten the 
problem related to causality (Tollefsen, Syse and Nicolaisen 1997). A white ball is 
rolling over the table and hits the black ball. Then the black ball starts to roll. Can 
we say for certain that the white ball caused the movement of the black ball? 
According to Hume; No. Hume, the father of the empiric tradition, says we could 
only observe that the two balls are touching each other and that two movements 
are following each other in time. However, we could not observe the causality 
itself and therefore not have certain knowledge about the direct relationship.  
It might for example be some kind of “invisible hand” that caused the movement 
of the black ball. Hume’s illustration is an extreme strict view of causality, but the 
story illustrates the same problem as we are facing. According to the loss 
aversion, we would predict asymmetric volatility and that the markets would react 
more severe to negative news compared to positive news. We do in fact also find 
Regression Coefficient 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Reg 5.8 (R-)2 52.9450*** 67.4235*** 68.9190*** 68.2109*** 33.6865*** 78.9232*** 17.9967*** 22.7643*** 67.3953*** 63.3598***
(7.9446) (5.6548) (3.9897) (7.3512) (7.2182) (7.6909) (11.5324) (9.1768) (9.3400) (11.1824)
Reg 5.9 (R+)2 -38.944*** 1.8320 -7.9869 -24.5859***-16.5360*** -79.2328*** -9.6319*** -9.0924*** -34.5410*** -47.0050***
(-3.4777) (0.1947) (-0.3415) (-2.6716) (-4.50865) (-7.8752) (-5.5351) (-3.7017) (-7.6799) (-6.9281)
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this relationship. However, our methodology is based on correlations and it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to determine the causality with certainty.  
 
5.3-7 Conclusion of prospect theory  
Our analysis supports prospect theory and the three empirical implications of the 
relationship between return and volatility. The reference point (H1), the loss 
aversion (H2), the risk seeking in the domain of loss (H3) and the risk aversion in 
the domain of gain (H4) are all supported by our analysis. The patterns in the 
market data are consistent with prospect theory. Hence, we conclude that prospect 
theory is a plausible explanation for the asymmetric pattern in volatility. Further, 
the loss aversion seems to be the strongest, or the most fundamental effect of 
prospect theory. The disposition effect can be seen as a manifestation of the risk 
seeking in the domain of loss and the risk aversion in the domain of gain. These 
effects will be further investigated in the next section.  
 
5.4 Testing of the disposition effect 
5.4-1 The disposition effect 
According to the disposition effect, investors tend to sell winners too early and 
hold on to losers for too long. In the case of disposition effects, we would expect 
to see the traded volume of a winner stock to increase, and the traded volume of a 
loser stock to decrease. Consequently, a demand shock would have a greater 
impact on the volatility of a loser stock, than of a winner stock, and we get 
asymmetric volatility. 
 
We used the daily volume and shares outstanding to compute daily turnover for 
each of the 25 companies and for the market portfolio (see eq. 5.10). The daily 
turnover for each company was regressed against the market turnover, using eq. 
5.11, in order to account for market-wide influences. VTit is the turnover (volume 
traded) of security i on day t, VTMt is the market turnover on day t, and εit is the 
disturbance term for company i in day t. Equation 5.12 highlights that the 
disturbance term of eq. 5.11 represents the abnormal turnover. 
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Daily turnoverit = Daily volumeit / shares outstandingit   (5.10) 
VTit = αi + βi VTMt + εit       (5.11) 
εit = AVTit = VTit – (αi + βi VTMt)      (5.12) 
 
The abnormal turnover (AVTit) will be positive if the particular stock had a higher 
turnover than the market, and vice versa. Further, we want to analyze if the 
abnormal turnover can be explained by movement in prices, according to what is 
predicted by the disposition effect. In other words, we want to determine if stocks 
with declining prices did have a lower turnover rate than the stocks with 
increasing prices. We tested this by creating six different binary variables to 
account for a previous price change, and regressed this binary variable against the 
abnormal turnover. Each stock on a given day was sorted into either a winning 
stock or a losing stock, according to whether its price per share had increased or 
decreased in the previous N days. The values of N were chosen in order to capture 
different holding periods; 1, 3, 10, 30, 100 and 250 days. Equation 5.13 shows the 
particular regression that was ran for each of the six binary variables. AVTit is the 
abnormal turnover of security i on day t and DNit is a binary variable for security i 
on day t, receiving the value of 1 if Pt > Pt-N and 0 otherwise.  
 
AVTit = αi + βi DNit + εit       (5.13)  
 
For each of the six definitions of winners and losers, the twenty-five companies 
will be sorted according to the t-values for their estimated beta coefficient. The 
firms are listed as having either a significant positive, negative or insignificant β-
coefficient. In table 5.4 we have reported the t-values for the β coefficient from 
equation 5.13 for the 25 firms listed on the OBX-index. A significant positive t-
value indicates that a winner stock had a higher abnormal return than a loser 
stock. Consequently, a significant positive t-value is supporting the disposition 
effect. 
 
H1: Stocks with a positive return will have a higher abnormal turnover than 
stocks with a negative return.  
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5.4-2 Results of disposition effect 
The one-day definition of winners and losers supports a disposition effect in the 
market. Out of the 25 firms listed on the OBX-index, 13 firms showed a 
significant positive beta. The other 12 proved insignificant, and the average t-
value came out to be 2.02. The GJR GARCH showed asymmetric volatility in the 
OBX-index and the one day binary variable points in the direction of a positive 
relationship between price and daily volume (turnover), as is predicted by the 
disposition effect theory. Hence, it seems that we do find the following pattern: 
 
Price down (up)  turnover down (up)   volatility up (down).  
 
For the three-day binary variable the results are weakly supporting the disposition 
effect with 8 significant positive betas versus only 3 significant negative ones. 
However, the majority of 14 firms all have insignificant beta values. For the other 
four binary variables the results are more or less ambiguous. The firms are spread 
out almost equally to each of the three significance levels, showing no systematic 
pattern of a disposition effect. 
 
Table 5.4: Number of firms on OBX with significant t-values for 2002-2011. 
Winner/Loser 
Definition 
2002  -  2011 
t < -1.96  -1.96 < t < 1.96 t > 1.96 Avg. t-value 
1 day 0 12 13 2.02 
3 days 3 14 8 1.11 
10 days 7 10 8 0.18 
30 days 9 9 7 -0.30 
100 days 10 8 7 -0.55 
250 days 12 3 10 -1.17 
Table 5.4 shows the t-values for the 25 beta-coefficients from equation 5.12 (AVTit = αi + βi DNit + εit), 
sorted according to the six different definitions of a winner stock;1, 3, 10, 30, 100 and 250 days period. A     
t-value above 1.96 indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of no disposition effect, at the 5 % level.    
 
The results show that there exists a positive significant relationship between the 
abnormal turnover and the movement in prices, for the one-day interval. Hence, if 
the stock price increased from yesterday to today, the abnormal turnover today 
will be higher than if the price had decreased. The results show clear differences 
with regard to the holding periods. It seems that a disposition effect is more easily 
found in short holding periods, at least for more liquid stocks like the ones on the 
OBX.     
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5.4-3 Conclusion of disposition effect 
Our analysis shows some evidence of a disposition effect in the OBX-index. 
For the one-day definition of a winner stock our findings supports a disposition 
effect in the market. For the three-day variable the results weakly supports a 
disposition effect. For the other four holding periods however, our findings show 
no clear pattern. Hence, we conclude that the disposition effect could be an 
explanation for the asymmetric volatility. 
 
6. Discussion and future research 
6.1 Rational explanations 
Our analysis showed no support for the feedback hypothesis and we concluded 
that the leverage hypothesis at best could be a weak explanation for the 
asymmetric volatility. These findings are consistent with several previous studies 
(See part 1 and 2). In the absence of other rational explanations, this is a positive 
indicator for a behavioral explanation. However, we cannot exclude the possibility 
of other potential undetected rational explanations. Further, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that news is more extreme in bear markets, something that also would 
explain the asymmetric volatility rationally.  
 
6.2 Contribution and discussion 
Earlier papers mostly investigate one or two explanations for the asymmetric 
volatility. Compared to these papers, our thesis is a more holistic approach testing 
all of the most known theories in one paper. Prospect theory is mentioned by Low 
(2004) as a potential explanation for the asymmetric volatility. However, he only 
mentions the theory while we go much deeper and more detailed into the 
relationship between prospect theory and the market volatility.  
 
In this thesis we analyze both the prospect theory and the heuristics in one paper. 
The heuristic explanations are based on a greater price-sensitivity of put options 
compared to call options. Implicit in this explanation there is an element of 
downside fear and loss aversion. Hence, it might be difficult to separate the effect 
of the heuristics from the effect of prospect theory. In our study we have tested the 
heuristics and the prospect theory in two separate analyses. Separating the effects 
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from different behavioral explanations is difficult and is related to the 
unparsimonious problem of behavioral explanations. However, based on our data, 
quantitative analysis, and our more qualitative analysis it might seems like loss 
aversion is the most fundamental effect of the behavioral explanations for the 
asymmetric volatility.  
 
The causality issue, discussed in detail in section 5.3-6, will always be a potential 
weakness for both the rational and the behavioral explanations. We do not know 
for certain that the observed patterns in the market data actually are caused by the 
specific theoretic explanation, although the data are consistent with our 
predictions. Based on loss aversion, for example, we would expect asymmetric 
volatility in the markets. However, we do not know for certain that the loss 
aversion actually causes the phenomenon.  
 
Evidence of behavioral effects in the markets may influence other academics to be 
more skeptical of underlying assumptions of rationality in economic models and 
incorporate more behavioral aspects in future model development. Both the 
awareness of the existing theories’ limitations and potential development of new 
more realistic theories may make the field of financial theory more useful for 
practitioners in the markets.  
6.3 Future research 
Psychological value and psychological perception affect the investors’ decision 
making. How the decisions are affected in more detail, and which decisions that 
are affected can be studied closer in a stock trading setting. One could also study 
the differences between private and institutional investors, large and small stocks, 
and different securities with regard to the asymmetric volatility. The causality 
issue and the unparsimonious problem could also be investigated further. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis we examine the asymmetric volatility in stock market returns, i.e. 
why the stock market is more volatile in down turns than in up turns. Our analyses 
show no support for the feedback hypothesis, while the leverage hypothesis is at 
best a weak explanation for the asymmetric volatility. This indicates that these 
rational theories are not the primary explanations for the asymmetric volatility, 
consistent with several earlier studies. We suggest that combining the traditional 
rational explanations with the behavioral approach will give a better 
understanding of the asymmetric volatility in the market. Our multiple regression 
(Reg. 5.1) shows that the contemporary relationship between return and implied 
volatility is the dominating one, supporting a behavioral explanation. The data are 
consistent with the heuristics; representativeness, affect and extrapolation bias. 
We also find support for prospect theory, including the loss aversion as well as the 
risk seeking behavior in the domain of loss and risk aversion in the domain of 
gain. The prospect theory is a well-established theory in experimental studies of 
single individuals’ behavior and we find that aggregated market data also is 
consistent with the theory. The disposition effect, which could be viewed as a 
manifestation of the non- linearity of the prospect theory, is partly confirmed by 
our analysis. We find a significant one day disposition effect in approximately 
half of the stocks on the OBX- index. We suggest a behavioral explanation for the 
asymmetric volatility and based on our data and analyses, loss aversion seems like 
the most plausible explanation. Why is the market more volatile when it falls? The 
most likely answer is simply that people do not like to lose. 
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